Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972

Terry Adams v. John W. Turner, Warden, Utah State Prison : Brief
of Appellant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.David P. Rhode; Attorneys for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Adams v. Turner, No. 12829 (1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5621

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
TERRY ADAMS,

Plai:ntif f-A ppellant,

-vs-

JOHN W. TURNER, WARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,
Defendant-Reapondent.

''

.

'•,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

;!

,

from the dismissal of appeIIan:t'•
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by the Third
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utaa,·
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson presiding.
·· .

,, .·'

,·:\

DAVID P. RHon•.,.:
. i'J..'''
231 East Fourth
., ·.. ,-,,,, ·
Salt Lake City, Utah
.
'"{'

Attorneys for

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Atoomey General, State of
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

.... :.;

1 1iq

q _. .

"'

-'"

.. '·

-· - -. "

fii Iu· L E...
v

'1'1 •. f

.... .. :r,.,.,i-:1:

',

· ·

1972 · . ' -"i'*Y

c..t, OWi

,

-

...

\jli!

.•
,

LORRAINE PRESS

1397 SOUTH MAIN STREET

BALT LAKB CITY, UTAH

PHON8 •W.alll

'· ':,,.

. -.

'

)

TABLE OF CONTEXTS
Pagf

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE ------------------------------------------------------

1

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT ____________

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL__________________

1

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS --------------------------------

2

ARGUl\1ENT
POINT I ______________________ ----------------------------------------PETITIONER CONTENDS T HA T
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
AFFORDED Hil\1 AN EVIDENTIARY HEAIUNG ON THE MERITS
OF HIS PETITION.

2

CASES CITED
Scandrett v. Turner, ________ Utah 2d ________ , 489 P2d
1186 ( 1971) -------------------------------·------------------------ 2, 3
State v. Adams, ________ Utah 2d ________ , P2d 1191
( 1971) ------------------------------------------------------------------

2

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-7-6 ( 1953) --------------------

2

In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
TERRY ADAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

JOHN ,V. TURNER, 'VARDEN.
UTAH STATE PRISON,

Case No.
12729

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial
court dismissing appellant's Petition for a 'Vrit of
Habeas Corpus.

DISPOSITION IX LO,VER COURT
Appellant's petition for a 'Vrit of Habeas Corpus
was dismissed on motion of the respondent without an
evidentiary hearing.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court dismissing his petition for a 'V rit of Habeas
Corpus.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner, Terry Adams was convicted of Assault
with a Deadly 'Veapon in violation of Utah Code Annotated, § 76-7-6 ( 195S )- The trial "as held in the Second Judicial District Court in and for 'Veber Countv
·'
State of Utah, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde presiding. Appellant was convicted by a jury and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison on February 16, 1971.
Petitioner appealed from his conviction to the Utah
Supreme Court, and his conviction was affirmed. Stnte
v. Adams, ........ Utah 2d, 489 P2d 1191 (1971). In his
petition for a 'Vrit of Habeas Corpus, the subject of
this appeal, petitioner raised precisely the same issues
raised in his original appeal. Because petitioner had
raised the same issues on appeal the Honorable Joseph
G. Jeppson granted the respondent's motion to dismiss.
citing Scandrett v. Turner, ........ Utah 2d ---·-···• 489 P2d
1186 ( 1971).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CONTENDS T H A T THE
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HA VE AFFORDED
Hil\I AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THR
MERITS OF HIS PETITION.
Petitioner contends that the trial court should have
afforded him an evidentiary hearing on the merits of
his petition. In doing so, petitioner realizes he is asking

e

3

the court to reYerse its position established in Scandrett
v. Turner, but he feels this approach is necessary to
clarify and perfect his position in terms of exhaustion
of state remedies before proceeding to federal court.
Petition contends that Scandrett v. Tiirner, should be
reversed. Appellant contends that all petitions for
Writs of Habeas Corpus should be considered with evidentiary hearings to promote an orderly and consistent
approach for petitioners seeking to gain relief in federal
court.
Respectfully submitted,

DAVID P. RHODE
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
12831

PAUL VICTOR SMITH,
Defendant and Appellant.

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Paul Victor Smith, appeals from his
conviction for Obtaining Money by False Pretenses.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury for the
crime of Obtaining Money by False Pretenses by the Honorable
Ronald 0. Hyde of the Second District Court and from the
judgment of guilty, Appellant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of
conviction.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the latter part of January, 1970, Wilford R.
Evans saw an advertisement in the Western Livestock Journal
directed primarily to cattle farmers, which reads as follows:
"If you are the owner of a small or large operation
and wish to expand we can show you how. Whether
commercial or purebred you can grow without pay
ing today's profit-depleting interest, without large
loans to repay. The net worth of your operation can
increase one quarter million and more. Call, write
or wire P. V. Smith & Associates, 309 West 12tn
Street, Ogden, Utah."
(T. 20)
Mr. Evans contacted Paul Victor Smith by telephone
and arranged an appointment for that evening, and together
with a friend, Lynn K. Neil, met with Mr. Smith at his office
in Ogden, Utah. Mr. Smith explained to Mr. Evans that he
could form a corporation and obtain financing either througn
a stock offering or through investors in order to expand hi1
cattle operation.
(T. 23, 24)
Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the
State, the following representations were made by Mr. Smitn
to Mr. Evans:

Q. Okay. Now did he say anything about the
financing of your actual business and how the finances wouln
be obtained?
A. Yes. He said he had investors that had this
capitol available. There was no problem. It was just a matter
of getting the legal papers put together and present it to them
and we was trying to do, and get it passed by his organizat10n
and the investors.
Q. Now, at that time did he indicate to you who
those investors might be?

-2-

A. No, he did not mention no names. He just said
that he had numerous investors in various places through the
country ... (T. 24)
On April 13, 1970, Mr. Evans paid Mr. Smith
$3, 100.00. Mr. Evans testified that the money was in consideration for Mr. Smith's agreement, "to get the investors to
put money into it, build a corporation and make it legal, and
set up the proper amount of shares for each individual as to
what shares would be owned and by who and who our officers
would be, and set up a legal structure."
(T. 26)
Throughout his testimony Mr. Evans maintained
that the financing was to be obtained through investors that
Mr. Smith allegedly said were already available. However, at
the same time Mr. Evans signed a Pre-Incorporation Agreement
which provided the $3,100.00 was to promote and clear a
public stock offering. (Exhibit L) Mr. Evans attempted to
explain the contradiction by saying that the public stock
offering was contingent upon the investors not coming
through with the necessary financing. (T. 187) Moreover,
even though Mr. Evans claimed that Mr. Smith assured him
that investors were definitely available, he filled out a form
which was to be used to solicit investors in the event the
money was not forthcoming. (T. 46, Exhibit 1)
Rulon Whitesides, Floyd Mingo, and Russell Pincock
testified substantially like Mr. Evans.
Eldon Wayne Burnett was an executive vicepresident of P. V. Smith and Associates at the time of the
negotiation with Mr. Evans. (T. 6 7) Prior to the agreement
with Mr. Evans, Mr. Burnett and Mr. Smith traveled to St.
Louis, Missouri to visit Capitol Consultants for the purpose
of obtaining investors although nothing definite was arranged
at that time. (T. 70, 81, 82)
There is no evidence that financing was unavailable
at the time of Mr. Smith's agreement with Mr. Evans. In fact,
the State's case is entirely premised upon Mr. Evan's testimony
that he received no money for expansion purposes.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
REPRESENT A TIO NS WHICH WERE ALLEGEDl
MADE BY THE APPELLANT REFERRED TO FUTUR:
ACTS OR EVENTS, AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE ,:
CRIME AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Mr. Evans testified that he paid the money to Mr
Smith to set up a corporation and obtain financing (T. 4J
These alleged representations were promissory in nature an
referred to future business transactions. A false pretense is
representation of some fact calculated to mislead,
not true, and a mere promise to do an act, even though r}
promisor has no intention at the time of keeping his promist
is not a criminal pretense or device. Stag_v. RobingtQ_!!, 75;
2d 394, (1950); State v. Semray, 199 A. 2d 580 (1963).
The following cases illustrate the principal that
false representation of a future act is not criminal. In
State, 83 S.W. 2d 668 (1935 ), the defendant was accusedc
obtaining an assignment of a bank account of his false promis,
to obtain and deliver bonds. Among other things, the Cour
said that the offense of obtaining money by false pretensesr
not shown notwithstanding the fact that the defendant obtair
ed property without a present intention of performance. Se1
Windham v. State 160 S.W. 72 (1913), where the accusei
obtained vendor's lien notes on his fraudulent promise to con
vey title to land; Rannn v. :r._e__Q£le, 22 N.Y. 413 (1860), wher1
the accused falsely promised to give the complaining witnei
employment upon his depositing $100.00 as security fo
faithful performance and
State, 123 S.W. 141
(1909), where money was loaned to the accused on his appar
ently false promise to invest the money in a house. See als'
v. DistricJ_ Court, 153 P. 2d 265 (1944).
In Chaplin v. United States, 157 F. 2d 697 (1950:
the Court reversed appellant's conviction. The question wa
whether the defendant's present intention not to do what h'
had promised to do is sufficient to support his criminal con
viction.
-4-

The Court referred to the danger of charging a
person with false pretenses on the sole basis of a fradulent
intention manifest by false and misleading promises. The
rationale of the Court's. opinion was that the intention to
commit certain crimes is ascertained by looking backward
from the act and finding that the accused intended to do what
he did do. However, in the case of false pretenses where the
act complained of is the failure to use money as specified, this
is as consonant with ordinary commercial default as with
criminal conduct. Business affairs would be materially
encumbered by the ever present threat that a debtor might
be subject to criminal penalties if the prosecutor and jury
were of the view that at the time of borrowing he was
mentally a cheat. Promissory fraud is indistinguishable from
innocent breach of contract except in the mental element.
The mental element is generally determined by reasoning backward from the act, i.e., in this instance, the non-performance.
A rule which makes promissory fraud criminal would therefore permit juries to punish innocent breaches of contract.

POINT II
IF IN FACT PAST OR PRESENT REPRESENT ATlON S WERE MADE BY APPELLANT THEY WERE NOT
PROVEN TO BE FALSE AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE A
CRIME AS A MATTER OF LAW.
All representations to Mr. Evans were promises of
future business transactions. By stretching the State's evidence
it could be said Mr. Smith's alleged statement that financing
was available is a statement of existing fact. However, the
State failed to produce evidence showing the alleged statement
to be false.
In Ballaine v. Dis_!_rict _ __C_2urt, supra, the Utah
Supreme
the elements which must be proved to
obtain a conviction for obtaining money by false pretenses.
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a.

A false or fraudulent representation;

b.

Representations made knowingly and desir
edly.

c.

Concurring intent to cheat or defraud ti S1
persom to whom the false pretenses were mac ft

d.

Something of value must be obtained;

e.

The party must have parted with things of val
in reliance on the false pretenses.

In this case the State failed to prove the fir,
element of
supra. As the Court said in S_tate_ 1
CasperS<2_f!, 262 P. 294 (1927) the pretense must be prove
false. The failure of Mr. Smith to obtain financing for M
Evans does not prove that financing was unavailable or th,
Mr. Smith did not attempt to secure investors. In fact, M1
Burnett testified to the contrary. (T. 70, 81, 82)
In Commonwealth v. Wright._275 A. 2d 873 (1971
appellant was convicted of cheating by fraudulent pretense
He picked up six truckloads of tires from complaintant valuei
at $4,400.00, agreeing to pay for the same, while representin,
himself to be the owner of E & W Warehouse Compam
Sharpsburg, Pennsylvania. The State attempted to show mi1
representation by testimony that the company did not exi1
at the Sharpsburg address six months later. The Court hek
that this was not competent evidence to prove appellant wa'
not the owner of E & W Warehouse Co., and that the addm
given did not exist at the time of the representation.
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CONCLUSION

All of the representation allegedly made by Mr.
Smith to Mr. Evans were of a promissory nature relating to
future business dealings. As a matter of law these type of
promises do not constitute criminal conduct, even though
false. Moreover, the State produced no evidence showing that
Mr. Smith's alleged representations were false when stated.

Respectfully submitted,

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney for Appellant
818 - 26th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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